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I illustrate with three classical examples the mistakes arising from 
using a modal operator admitting multiple interpretations in the 
same argument; the flaws arise especially easily if no attention is 
paid to the range of propositional variables. Premisses taken 
separately might seem convincing and a substitution for a 
propositional variable in a modal context might seem legitimate. 
But there is no single interpretation of the modal operators 
involved under which all the premisses are plausible and the 
substitution successful. !
Keywords: Church-Fitch paradox, futura contingentia, modal 
logic, modal operators, propositional quantification, Swinburne’s 
modal argument !!!
1. Introduction !
Certain arguments use modalities in close, but different meanings. This 
might lead to the situation in which premisses taken separately seem 
convincing (and substitution for a propositional variable might seem 
legitimate), but nevertheless, no single interpretation of the modal 
operators involved makes all the premisses plausible and the substitution 
legitimate. 
While it’s difficult to a priori point to a wider class of arguments in 
which the problem arises, the issue might be more common than it might 
seem: at least in philosophical arguments it occurs in quite different 
contexts. This suggests that philosophers should be on the lookout for this 
type of error whenever a philosophical argument involving both 
modalities and propositional quantification is involved.  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The goal of this paper is to diagnose this problem in a few fairly well-
known philosophical arguments, which normally aren’t discussed 
together, and whose similarity hasn’t been previously noticed: 
1. Swinburne's modal argument for the existence of the soul; 
2. a logical argument for fatalism; 
3. the Church-Fitch paradox. 
The goal of discussing arguments concerning quite different topics is to 
emphasize that the flaw isn’t too topic-dependent. The arguments were 
chosen because they are well-known, they concern different topics and 
yet they all commit the same fallacy. 
From the assumption that it is logically possible that a human being 
survives the destruction of their body and a few additional modal 
premisses Richard Swinburne infers the actual existence of souls. Various 
variants of the argument against future contingents rely on modal and 
temporal premisses and seem to lead to the conclusion that there are no 
future contingent events. The Church-Fitch paradox leads to the 
conclusion that the existence of unknown truths excludes all truths being 
knowable. I start with presenting the first two arguments, then I argue 
that whatever appearance of soundness they have, they owe it to the 
ambiguity of the modal operators involved and lack of attention to 
propositional quantifier range. Then I describe the third argument and 
point out a similar issue with it. 
While the arguments for the sake of clarity and brevity are to some extent 
formalized, the main point is not about the formal tools, but rather about 
their misuse in representation of the underpinning philosophical 
intuitions. !
2. Swinburne’s modal argument !
Let’s start with the original formulation of the argument. The argument in 
its fullest version can be found in (Swinburne 1986, ch. 8). It also occurs 
in (Swinburne and Shoemaker 1984, ch. 2). In (Swinburne 1996) the 
author develops a defense of the modal argument against certain 
objections raised in the literature of the subject. 
First, some abbreviations. ◇ is the possibility operator, ☐ is the necessity 
operator, ∧ is the conjunction symbol, → is material implication, ⇒ is the 
logical/definitional implication, ↔ is material equivalence, ⇔ is the 
logical/definitional equivalence, and ¬ is the negation symbol. 
The key difference between the single arrow symbols and double arrow 
symbols is that the former are connectives in the object language, while 
the latter are meta-linguistic. Moreover, material equivalence only says 
that it is not the case that one side is true and the other false, while the  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definitional/logical equivalence requires that it is necessarily so, and 
allows for the substitution of equivalents in modal contexts. 
I customized propositional constants for mnemonic purposes. 
C ⇔ Swinburne is a Conscious person and exists in 1984. 
D ⇔ Swinburne's body is completely Destroyed in the last 
instant of 1984. 
S ⇔ Swinburne has a Soul in 1984. 
E ⇔ Swinburne Exists in 1985. 
Swinburne introduces a variable p that is supposed to range over 
propositions of a specific sort: “p ranges over all consistent propositions 
compatible with C∧D and describing 1984 states of affairs.” (Swinburne 
1996, 69) We’ll work with T as the underlying modal logic (that is, apart 
from distributing ☐ over implication, we have reflexivity (☐p →p) 
which requires that whatever is necessary is true. 
The first premiss of the argument is contingent. It says that Swinburne is 
a conscious person and exists in 1984: 
(1) C 
The second premiss states that for any sentence about 1984 compatible 
with C and D it is possible that Swinburne survives the destruction of his 
body, and yet that his compatible sentence is true: 
(2) For all p, ◇(C∧D∧p∧E) 
The third premiss says that it is not possible (at least for Swinburne) to 
survive the complete destruction of his body if he doesn’t have a soul (an 
immaterial part): 
(3) ¬◇(C∧D∧¬S∧E) 
Premiss (2) says that any sentence compatible with C∧D and describing 
1984 states of affairs is compatible with C∧D∧E but premiss (3) says that 
¬S is not compatible with C∧D∧E. Therefore, ¬S is not a sentence that is 
compatible with C∧D and describes 1984 states of affairs. Or, in other 
words, premisses (2) and (3) together entail that ¬S is not within the 
range of p. But if ¬S is not compatible with C∧D, then C∧D entails S. 
But D doesn’t have any impact on the truth of S, and so, if C∧D entails S, 
then so does C alone. 
The argument has been developed into a fully formalised form and 
reformulated into a version immune to what was considered the main 
objection put forward in (Zimmerman 1991; Alston and Smythe 1994; 
Stump and Kretzmann 1996). Full details of the construction and a longer 
discussion of known objections can be found in (Urbaniak and Rostalska, 
2010). Here I just present the final effect.  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To proceed with our analysis, we need three more abbreviations. 
84(p) ⇔ it is a fact about 1984, that p 
By 84(p) we only mean that p states something about an event or a state 
of affairs in 1984 and it does not state anything about an event or state of 
affairs “outside of” 1984. What is also important, a sentence does not 
have to be true in order to be about 1984. The notion of being about 1984 
is a bit vague, but in fact we do have decent intuitions about whether a 
sentence is (purely) about 1984. So, for instance, we exclude sentences 
like: 
It is the case in 1984 that in 1985 Swinburne will not exist. 
Although, in a way, this sentence is about 1984, it is not purely about 
1984, because it clearly implies a contingent sentence about 1985. 
However, both sentences: 
Swinburne is purely material in 1984. 
Swinburne is not purely material in 1984. 
seem, on the face of it, to be purely about 1984. While prima facie it 
might seem that 84(-) is a predicate, it is intended as a connective: “it is a 
claim about 1984 that …” is supposed to be completed by a sentence, not 
a name thereof. Sometimes, in informal discussion I will simplify the 
discourse by speaking as if I was talking about a predicate, but in such 
cases nothing in the discussion prevents reformulation in which it is made 
explicit that 84(-) is a connective. 
Now, we also add a piece of notation for expressing the property of being 
true about 1984: 
(4) tr84(p) ⇔ 84(p)∧ p 
The third abbreviation is: 
(5) ◇(p∧C∧D) ⇔ p is compatible with C∧D. 
It may seem slightly unclear what sort of compatibility Swinburne has in 
mind. He emphasises that it is the same notion as that of logical 
coherence, quite explicitly denying that there is a separate “metaphysical” 
kind of necessity: “…the contrast is misleading. For not merely is the 
necessity of both kinds equally hard, but has the same nature - the 
necessary is that which holds in all possible worlds, where ‘possible’ 
means ‘coherently describable’ ” (Swinburne 1986, 314). 
Now, we can carefully state the evolved version of the argument. The 
first premiss only states that Swinburne is alive and conscious in 1984: 
(6) C 
The second premiss is a modification of Swinburne’s original second 
premiss. It also captures the assumption about the range of variables that  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was mentioned but not included in the formula. At the first stab we might 
want to formalize the assumption as follows: 
(7) For all p, [84(p)∧◇(p∧C∧D) →◇(C∧D∧p∧E)] 
This, however, would leave the argument unnecessarily open to the 
following objection. Eliminate the universal quantifier and substitute M 
for p, where 
M⇔Swinburne is purely material in 1984 for p. 
84(M) seems intuitively true: Swinburne’s being purely material in 1984 
is a fact about 1984. Moreover, ◇(M∧C∧D) also seems true, unless we 
want to decide the issue at question beforehand: it is at least possible that 
Swinburne is purely material and conscious in 1984, and his body is 
destroyed in the last instant of 1984. This would make the antecedent of 
the resulting substitution at least strongly plausible. The consequent — 
◇(C∧D∧M∧E) — however, would say that it is possible that Swinburne 
is conscious and purely material in 1984, his body is destroyed in the last 
instant in 1984, and yet he manages to survive into 1985. This doesn’t 
seem plausible, and so (7) could be argued to entail a substitution which 
isn’t very convincing. 
Now, using tr84 instead of 84 we obtain: 
(8) For all p, [tr84(p)∧◇(p∧C∧D) →◇(C∧D∧p∧E)] 
(8) says about any proposition p that if it is true, purely about 1984, and 
compatible with C∧D, it is compatible not only with the claim that 
Swinburne is conscious and alive in 1984 and his body is destroyed in the 
last moment of 1984, but also compatible with the claim that Swinburne 
is conscious and alive in 1984, his body is destroyed in the last moment 
of 1984 and yet he survives and exists in 1985. 
(8) is not susceptible to an objection analogous to the one that we just put 
forward against (7). For say we eliminate the universal quantifier and 
substitute M for p. To argue that this substitution is false, we need to 
argue that its antecedent is true. But the first conjunct now reads tr84(M) 
— 84(M)∧M — and while in the previous argument we only needed the 
assumption that being material and conscious is at least possible, now we 
would need the assumption that Swinburne indeed was purely material in 
1984. But insisting that this is the case already decides the issue to be 
decided by the argument. To undermine a premiss, we’d be arguing that it 
is false, because the conclusion of the whole argument is — not an 
interesting criticism at all. 




It is obviously equivalent to: 
(10) ☐(C∧D∧E →S) 
(10) says that necessarily, if Swinburne is conscious and alive in 1984, 
his body is destroyed in the last moment of 1984 and yet he exists in 
1985, he has a soul in 1984. It is meant to capture the intuition that to 
survive the destruction of one’s body, one has to have a soul. 
The next premiss says that ‘Swinburne does not have a soul in 1984’ is 
purely about 1984: 
(11) 84(¬S) 
and another one claims that if C and D necessarily entail S, then so does 
C: 
(12) ☐(C∧D → S) → ☐(C → S) 
That is, if the facts that Swinburne exists and is conscious in 1984 and 
that his body is destroyed in the last moment of 1984 entail that 
Swinburne has a soul in 1984, the fact that Swinburne’s body is destroyed 
in the last moment of 1984 has no relevance for this conclusion and the 
very fact that Swinburne is alive and conscious in 1984 already 
necessitates the fact that Swinburne has a soul in 1984. 
These assumptions logically entail S. First, eliminate the universal 
quantifier from (8), substituting ¬S for p: 
(13) tr84(¬S)∧◇(¬S∧C∧D) → ◇(C∧D∧¬S∧E) 
from (9) and (13) we obtain: 
(14) ¬[tr84(¬S)∧◇(¬S∧C∧D)] 
we apply De Morgan’s law to it: 
(15) ¬tr84(¬S) or ¬◇(¬S∧C∧D) 
At this point we split the disjunction into a proof by cases. Suppose 
¬tr84(¬S). By (4) this means that either ¬84(¬S) or ¬¬S. But (11) says 
that 84(¬S). So ¬¬S and hence S. Suppose on the other hand that 
¬◇(¬S∧C∧D). In this case we get: 
(16) ¬◇(¬S∧C∧D) 
Quite easily we now obtain: 
(17) ☐¬(¬S∧C∧D) 
Since: 
(18) ¬(¬S∧C∧D) ⇔ [(C∧D) → S] 
and because we can substitute logically equivalent expressions within the 
scope of modal operators, we can infer:  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(19) ☐((C∧D) → S) 
Now, we apply modus ponens to (12) and (19) and obtain: 
(20) ☐(C → S) 
With (6), by reflexivity for ☐ and modus ponens, this entails: 
(21) S 
Either way we obtain S, which completes the argument. 
!
3. Assessing Swinburne’s argument !
The argument might be criticised for being epistemically circular in the 
following sense. Basically, (8) says that no true proposition compatible 
with Swinburne’s being alive and conscious in 1984 and his body being 
destroyed excludes the possibility of him surviving the destruction of his 
body. This is a fairly strong claim, because it is equivalent to the claim 
that any proposition about 1984 compatible with C∧D, which excludes 
the possibility of Swinburne’s survival (while C∧D), is already false. 
To see the equivalence, unpack the expression in the scope of the 
quantifier in (8) as follows: 
84(p)∧p∧◇(p∧C∧D) →◇(C∧D∧p∧E) 
It is now a matter of purely propositional manipulation (contraposition, 
really) to see that this is equivalent to: 
84(p)∧◇(p∧C∧D)∧¬ ◇(C∧D∧p∧E)→¬p 
Thus, for instance, if one believes that M (⇔ Swinburne’s is purely 
material in 1984) excludes such a possibility, and is compatible with 
C∧D, one is committed also to the falsity of M. But if this is the case, by 
accepting (8) we already seem to have a firm philosophical position on 
the issue. 
A way out seems to be to say that no sentence purely about 1984 is 
incompatible with Swinburne's survival in 1985 because sentences purely 
about 1984 don't entail anything about 1985. So, no such sentence, even 
if true, could exclude Swinburne's survival of the destruction of his body. 
So to avoid the difficulty from the previous paragraph, one needs to 
interpret compatibility using a Humean notion of necessity on which no 
truth about one time necessitates anything about some other time, 
presumably Swinburne’s notion of logical necessity. 
Alas, the problem is that if we assume that our notion of compatibility is 
purely logical, we now have a reason to reject premiss (9) which says that  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Swinburne cannot survive the complete destruction of his body and 
continue to exist in 1985 if he doesn't have a soul in 1984. After all, as 
Humean logical modality is involved, we have no reason to think that a 
sentence purely about 1984 should be analytically incompatible with any 
sentence about 1985. In other words, to accept (9) we have to use a 
stronger, presumably metaphysical interpretation of modality on which 
not having a soul in 1984 is incompatible with surviving the destruction 
of the body at the end of 1984. 
Swinburne argued (in personal communication) that the truth of (8) is 
available even to children when he tries to explain the argument to them. 
They tend to agree when faced with statements like ‘Look, it is at least 
logically possible, whatever else is true and doesn't exclude us being 
conscious and our bodies being completely destroyed, that we survive the 
complete destruction of our bodies’. There are two points to make to 
explain these intuitions away. First, there is a notion of possibility on 
which (8) comes out true, but which falsifies (9). It is quite likely that 
some people, when faced with the sentence quoted in this passage, use 
this notion to assess its truth. Then, when they're faced with the informal 
reading of (9), they use quite a different metaphysical notion of 
possibility not noticing the difference. Second, there is an important 
scope distinction to be kept in mind. On one reading, the quoted sentence 
says exactly what (8) says, and yields a rather strong statement. On the 
other reading, it rather says that no matter what is true about 1984 and 
doesn't exclude C and D, it is still possible to survive the complete 
destruction of one's body. On the second reading, anyone who admits 
◇(C∧D∧E), a rather weak claim of mere logical possibility is committed 
to this claim. On this reading, however, the claim is too weak to 
constitute a premiss of a valid modal argument. 
The issue can be rephrased in terms of substitutions: on one reading, 
substituting ¬S for p when eliminating the quantifier yields a false 
antecedent, but we have no reason to accept the premiss, and on another, 
we have a reason to accept both the premiss and its substitution, but we 
have no reason to think that the consequent of the resulting sentence is 
false.  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4. Arguing against future contingents !
Aristotle in the IXth chapter of On Interpretation considers an argument 
for the non-existence of propositions about future contingent events. The 
argument is supposed to defend fatalism, the view that each future event 
will take place necessarily. The view that one can prove fatalism on 
merely logical grounds is called logical fatalism. I put well-known 
interpretative issues related to Aristotle’s formulation aside (see however 
Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995, 6-109) and look at a streamlined version of 
one of the best formulations of an argument for logical fatalism as 
developed by Prior and Rescher (see Prior 1967, 119-121). 
• Formula Fyp is read in y units of time it will be the case that p. 
• Analogously we read the formula Pyp as y units of time ago it was the 
case that p. 
• Formula Tap reads it is true at time a that p. 
Before we move to the argument itself, some preliminary inference rules 
are needed: 
(RT) If ⊢p, then  ⊢Tap, for all a 
(TC) Ta(p → q) ⊢Tap → Tab 
(RD) If ⊢p, then ⊢☐ap, for all a 
(DC) ☐a(p → q) ⊢☐ap →☐aq 
Roughly, (RT) says that whatever is provable is true at any time a, and 
(TC) says that truth at any time a distributes over implication. (RD) says 
that whatever is provable is necessary at any time a, and (DC) states that 
being necessary at a distributes over implication. All of these principles 
seem quite convincing. 
We start the argument with a premiss saying that p will be true in n units 
of time just in case it was m units of time ago true that p would be true in 
m+n units of time, and another premiss saying that if it is true at a that p 
was true m units of time ago, it is necessary that p was true m time units 
ago: 
(P1) Fnp ↔PmF(m+n)p 
(P2) TaPmp →☐aPmp 
(P2) is supposed to capture the intuition that the past is necessary and 
cannot be changed. Now, (RT) and (TC) allow us to first add Ta in front 
of the left-to-right implication from (P1) and then distribute it over the 
implication: 
(AP2) TaFnp→TaPmF(m+n)p 
Let’s now substitute F(m+n)p for p in (P2): 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(AP3) TaPmF(m+n)p →☐aPmF(m+n)p 
(AP2) with (AP3) give us: 
(AP4) TaFnp→☐aPmF(m+n)p 
Now we take the right-to-left implication from (P1) and use (RD) and 
(DC) to introduce and distribute the necessity operator: 
(AP5) ☐aPmF(m+n)p →☐aFnp 
Finally, we put (AP4) and (AP5) together, obtaining the conclusion of the 
argument: 
(AP6) TaFnp→☐aFnp 
This conclusion says that whenever it is at a true that p will take place in 
n time units, it is necessarily the case. 
Having described the arguments, let’s focus on identifying the type of 
error that makes it seem plausible. !
5. Assessing argument about future contingents !
(RT), (RD) and (P1) seem rather innocent. One could be worried that 
(TC) and (DC) correspond to axiom K of the standard modal logic, which 
results in issues related to logical omniscience and some deontic 
paradoxes. These issues, however, don’t seem to carry over to the 
temporal reading. As for the former, while perhaps it is a problem that 
actual agents’ knowledge is not closed under logical consequence, there 
is no good argument to the effect that being true at a time shouldn’t be so 
closed. As for the latter, most notable paradoxes are the Good Samaritan 
paradox and Ross’s paradox. The Good Samaritan arises when one 
formalizes It ought to be the case that Jones helps Smith who has been 
robbed as O(h∧r) and then uses K to infer Or, that Smith should be 
robbed. Part of the issue is that the formalization does violence to the 
original premiss, which, come to think about it, doesn’t say that it ought 
to be the case that Jones helps Smith and that Smith has been robbed. But 
even if we’re worried about conjunction elimination in deontic contexts, 
it doesn’t seem to be problematic when applied to being true at a time. 
Ross’s paradox, on the other hand, arises when K is used to deduce 
O(m∨b), that it ought to be the case that the letter is mailed or burned, 
from Om, the claim that it ought to be the case that the letter is mailed. 
Again, while there might be reasons to think that obligation is not closed 
under disjunction, there is no analogous intuition about being true at a 
time.  1
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So it seems the most troubling move is the one captured by (P2). How 
exactly should we understand the modality in (P2)? 
Alas, on this reading, no one who doesn’t already accept causal 
determinism will accept the premiss itself. For then (P2) says that 
whatever happened in the past was causally determined, which is not 
something that someone who believes certain past human choices were 
made freely would accept. 
So perhaps we should focus on a somewhat different reading, according 
to which it is not being causally determined, but rather there being at 
time a no way of influencing the truth-value of p. On this reading, the 
premiss only seems to say that whatever is in the past can no longer be 
changed. And indeed, we do seem to have this intuition if p is a simple 
sentence clearly about the past. For instance, if it so happened that 
student X failed his logic exam, nothing in the future can be done to 
change this fact from the past.  2
But now, the key move is from (P2) to (AP3), where for p we substituted 
F(m+n)p. As pointed out already by Ockham (see Boehner and Ockham 
1945), claims such as it was the case m units of time ago that in m+n 
units of time p will be the case are not strictly about the past. While an 
indeterminist might still have the intuition that we can do nothing to 
change past events (even though some of the past choices were free at the 
time when they were made), she will definitely deny that such spuriously 
past-tensed descriptions really describe a past event. 
The problem is clear: as far as in this interpretation (P2) is convincing for 
sentences not about the future, if we allow substitutions of sentences 
involving the future it turns out to build in the intended conclusion: the 
necessity of all future events. (Having said that, developing a formal 
semantics for temporal logic which captures the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate substitutions is quite a task - see for example 
the discussion in Prior 1967.) 
This can be avoided by restricting the range of legitimate substitutions 
(we did the same thing when making the range of quantifiers explicit in 
Swinburne’s argument). Say by D<ap we mean the truth value of p does 
not depend on any facts occurring after a, (P2) should be replaced with 
(P2′) D<ap→(TaPmp→☐aPmp) 
Switching to (P2′) avoids the objection we just raised: for (P2′) now says 
that if the truth-value of p doesn’t depend on any facts occurring after a, 
then if it is true at a that p was true m units of time ago, it is also 
necessary at a that p was true m units of time ago.  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The problem now is that the conclusion of the whole argument with (P2′) 
in place of (P2) no longer follows because it clearly is not the case that 
D<aF(m+n)p. 
Why did we buy into (P2) in its full strength to start with, then? For one 
thing, plain carelessness and not thinking about whether accepting (P2) 
with all its tricky substitutions captures our intuition about the past being 
irreversible. But I think there’s an associated reason, that has to do with 
further confusion with another modality. We are so used to thinking about 
alethic modalities such as logical or metaphysical necessity and to the 
ultimate validity of logical principles involving such modalities, that we 
are without much hesitation willing to accept all substitutions of what 
seems to us to be a valid general principle about a modality. This 
however should not be the case with temporal modalities, which turn out 
to be a bit more tricky. 
So we observed a situation where in a modal context our intuitions about 
which substitutions should be admitted lead us astray. The situation, it 
seems, isn’t very unique. Let’s take a look at yet another case. !
6. Church-Fitch paradox !
Here’s another well-known argument that turns around a tricky 
substitution mixed with a modal context. The goal of the argument is to 
show that one cannot consistently claim that all truths are knowable and 
that there is at least one unknown truth. Let’s start with formulating the 
premisses, next we’ll see how the conclusion follows, and then we’ll 
move to the assessment. Aside from classical logic in the background, the 
premisses and principles needed for the argument are as follows (K reads 
it is known that/one knows that): 
(IK) For some p (p∧¬Kp) 
(Know) For all p, ⊢(p →◇Kp) 
(Distr) K(p∧q) ⊢Kp∧Kq 
(Fact) Kp⊢p 
(Contra) If p⊢⏊, then ◇p⊢⏊ 
(IK) says that our knowledge is incomplete, that there is at least one 
unknown true proposition. (Know) states the knowability of any true 
proposition. (Distr) allows to distribute knowledge over a conjunction, 
and (Fact) states the factivity of knowledge: that whatever is known is 
true. (Contra) says that the possibility claim of a contradictory 
proposition is already contradictory. 
Now the reasoning. (IK) says that there is a true sentence, say n, that is 
not known. (in a formal proof this move would correspond to the elimina-  
16
Different Arguments, Same Problems. Modal ambiguity and tricky substitutions
-tion of the existential quantifier, substituting a fresh propositional 
constant n for p), 
(IK2) n∧¬Kn 
As (Know) contains a universal quantifier, we can eliminate it, 
substituting any formula whatsoever for p. In particular, let’s substitute 
the content of (IK2): 
(Know2) n∧¬Kn → ◇K(n∧¬Kn) 
Now we can simply apply detachment to (IK2) and (Know2) getting: 
(IK3) ◇K(n∧¬Kn) 
Now, we will show that what’s in the scope of ◇ in (IK3) entails a 
contradiction, which thanks to (Contra) will allow us to deduce 
contradiction from (IK3) itself. We apply (Distr) to K(n∧¬Kn) and 
eliminate the conjunction: 
(IK4) Kn 
(IK5) K¬Kn 
Now, we apply (Fact) to (IK5) to obtain 
(IK6) ¬Kn 
which together with (IK4) yields a contradiction. This means that by 
(Contra), a contradiction follows already from (IK3). We obtained the 
conclusion that a contradiction is possible, whose negation can be proven 
in a very rudimentary modal logic K. So it seems that (IK) and (Know) 
exclude each other! 
Perhaps, we’re to blame (Distr) or (Fact) for the pickle? Well, (Fact) 
seems like a principle capturing the factivity of knowledge, and isn’t 
independently known to lead to undesired consequences. One might, 
however, have an issue with (Distr) and axiom K, pointing out that they 
build logical omniscience into the system (well, Distr does this only 
partially). 
But what would an attempt to solve the paradox by insisting that (Distr) 
doesn’t apply here look like? One would have to deny the inference from 
(IK3) to (IK4) — that is, one would have to deny that if a subject knows 
that (n and it is not known that n), then it follows that the subject knows 
that n and they know that it is not known that n. This doesn’t seem too 
convincing and would require an independent motivation. Moreover, 
such a solution would, so to speak, come too late: already (IK3) seems 
rather absurd, and so something problematic must’ve preceded the 
application of (Distr).  3
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It seems that the issues with logical omniscience and those brought up by 
the Church-Fitch paradox aren’t too related — after all, the reasoning 
involved is very simple and doesn’t involve any massive complication 
that could prevent the subject from grasping the fact, say, that conjuncts 
follow from a conjunction and so their knowledge is closed at least under 
eliminating conjunction once. 
!
7. Assessing Church-Fitch paradox !
Now, the whole trick is made possible by substituting n∧¬Kn for p in the 
knowability principle (Know), leading to (Know2). And come to think 
about it, if n is a true but unknown sentence, there is nothing amazing 
about n∧¬Kn not being knowable. After all, if you know this conjunction, 
you know n, so you at the same time falsify the second conjunct! The 
whole argument is just a way of explicating this fact. 
But of course, you might think that this is a rather cheap shot, because 
this is not the sort of substitutions you had in mind. You can still accept 
the spirit of the knowability principle and say: when I said all truths are 
knowable I meant actual truths about the non-epistemic world, not some 
tricky sentences involving claims about what is known, I don’t know 
which tricky sentences involving epistemic operators are and which aren't 
knowable! And once this restriction on substitution is made, the argument 
doesn’t fly to far. 
Having said this, the challenge of developing a formal framework 
explaining which substitutions exactly lead to problems and which don’t 
is quite daunting. This is especially so if we want to be less conservative 
than we are by excluding all formulas involving epistemic operators. The 
problem generated quite a lot of literature (see for instance Kvanvig 2006 
and Salerno 2009). People who think this is an important problem have 
spent considerable amount of time thinking about this without reaching 
agreement. 
One notable proposal, for instance, is due to Tennant (2002). Take the 
example of “No thinkers exist”. The proposition is consistent, but can’t 
be known to be true (assuming only thinkers can know things). Such 
sentences (whose knowledge claims are not possible) Tennant calls anti-
Cartesian. Sentences which are not anti-Cartesian are said to be 
Cartesian. A sentence of the type Kp can be impossible for various 
reasons: it might be that p itself is inconsistent, it might be the case that 
judging that p requires the falsity of some consequence of p, or it might 
be that Kp is impossible due do the logical structure of p itself, despite p 
being consistent.  Tennant’s antidote to the Church-Fitch paradox is: 
restrict the knowability claim to Cartesian propositions only.  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The approach definitely blocks the paradox, and is definitely common-
sensical in spirit: don’t use tricky unintended substitutions which due to 
logical complexities involve you in impossibilities. It also nicely 
illustrates how rather unexciting the philosophical lessons from taking 
such paradoxes too seriously can get. At its core, the proposal simply is: 
when I say that all truths are knowable, of course I don’t mean truths 
which a priori can’t be known for various rather trivial reasons that have 
to do pretty much with self-reference. In all fairnes, it’s hard to draw any 
deeper lesson here. 
Again, the phenomenon seems to be that initially a formula seems like an 
adequate formalisation of our pre-formal claim, and only after further 
formal development which uses tricky unintended and unexpected 
substitutions it is revealed that the formula in its whole unintended 
generality wasn’t so convincing to start with. 
!
8. So what do they have in common? !
I surveyed three different arguments about quite different issues, which 
turned out to share the following features: 
(A) They all employ somewhat unexpected substitution for a 
propositional variable or for a schematic letter. 
- In the case of Swinburne's argument, premise (8), which roughly 
captures the intuition that nothing consistent with Swinburne's being 
conscious prior to the destruction of his body excludes his survival, is 
used by substituting a claim on the very matter at hand "Swinburne 
doesn't have a soul" for the propositional variable, and the interplay of 
various modalities involved in the argument with our shaky intuitions 
are used to make the argument seem plausible. 
- In the case of the logical argument against future contingents, a claim 
involving tricky reference through time, F(m+n)p, is substituted for p 
in (P2). 
- In the Church-Fitch paradox a clearly a priori unknowable claim is 
substituted for a variable in the knowability principle, which doesn't 
seem to be intended to be applicable to such claims. 
(B) The substitution is applied to a prima facie plausible premiss.  
- In Swinburne's argument the intuition supporting (2) is that at least we 
should treat the possibility of Swinburne's survival as an open 
possibility. 
- In the fatalistic argument, (P2) at least prima facie is supported by the 
intuition that past cannot be changed.  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- In the Church-Fitch paradox the assumption is an expression of 
cognitive optimism to the effect that at least in principle any aspect of 
the world can be the subject of knowledge. 
(C) The substitution is made in a modal context.  
- In Swinburne's argument, as discussed, how the modalities are 
understood bears on how plausible particular premisses are. 
- In the fatalistic argument the modalities involved are temporal, and 
various considerations arise from different interpretations of what it 
means for the past to be unchangeable. 
- In the Church-Fitch paradox, the modal context is epistemic. !
Given the discussion so far, the following claims also clearly hold: 
(D) The arguments lead to very strong conclusions from prima facie 
innocent premisses. 
(E) The unclarity about which modality is involved and which 
substitutions are intended as admissible, given the choice of 
modality, makes the premisses prima facie plausible and the 
argument at least initially plausible. 
Problems with these arguments are not at the formal level: they arise at 
the level of formalisation. The goal of the paper wasn't to show that there 
are logical flaws in the arguments. Quite the opposite: with all 
assumptions in place, the (semi-)formal arguments are logically correct in 
the sense that the conclusion follows from the premisses by means of the 
rules stated. The goal, however, was to show that logically correct 
arguments can be used to philosophically suboptimal effects, as long as 
not enough attention is paid to formalization, to the underlying intuitions, 
and philosophical justifications of the premisses. 
Given that the problems are with philosophical moves and not with 
formal systems, it is difficult to formulate simple general principles that 
would help to avoid such infelicities. I hope my critical survey, however, 
will raise the reader’s sensitivity to the meaning of modalities and to the 
range of propositional variables used in various arguments. These issues, 
while they might sound quite distant from the point of view of a serious 
philosopher who wants to argue for a strong philosophical position, 
cannot be ignored. The devil is in the detail. 
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